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Abstract 
This paper presents a game-theoretical spatial analysis of Commission appointment in the European 
Union (EU). In the model the European Parliament (EP) and the member states in the Council look 
ahead and consider the policy outcomes that result from the appointment of alternative Commissions. 
In contrast to earlier work we assume that the EP and the member states have incomplete information 
on the consequences of EU policies, whereas the Commission acquires private information on the link 
between policies and outcomes. As a result, we generate new insights in the Commission’s appointment. 
In particular, we find that the increased use of codecision in the legislative process gives the Council an 
incentive to appoint a Commission that is closer to the EP, because the EP then trusts the Commission 
more. Thus this theory sheds new light on the so-called Spitzenkandidaten Coup that preceded the 
appointment of the Juncker Commission in 2014. 
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1. Introduction 
The Commission plays an important role in European Union (EU) policy-making. It is often 
referred to as the EU executive body, but perhaps its most striking feature is its monopoly agenda-setting 
right in the EU legislative process. In the early days after the creation of what later became the EU the 
Commission was usually considered as a body of technocrats appointed by the member state 
governments to develop policy initiatives. Over the years its appointment and its role in the legislative 
process have become more politicized. The European Parliament (EP) now appoints the Commission 
together with the member states as represented in the European Council. As a result the Commission’s 
composition now reflects the majorities and varieties of political affiliations in both these institutions.  
Specifically the Commission appointment process has undergone the following changes since the 
1950s. Prior to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty the member states in the Council unanimously appointed the 
Commission. Since Maastricht the EP has to approve the Commission proposed to it by the Council. As 
a result the appointed Commission reflects the preferences of both the Council and the EP, since both 
have a say in the appointment procedure (Hug, 1997, 2003). The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty also gave the 
EP a veto on the appointment of the Commission President in addition to its veto on the appointment of 
the Commission as a body. Since the 2001 Nice Treaty the Council has been nominating the Commission 
by qualified majority voting (QMV) rather than unanimity. The 2007 Lisbon Treaty, finally, states that 
the Council has to take the results of the EP elections into account when nominating a Commission 
President. This does not represent a hard constraint on member state behavior, however. For that reason 
we treat it as inconsequential within the scope of our formal model. We provide a summary of these 
reforms in Table 1. For a more extensive historical account, see Crombez and Hix (2011). 
 
** Table 1 about here** 
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As in the Commission appointment process the EP’s current rights in the legislative process were 
not acquired in one discrete jump, but rather there was a stepwise increase through a series of Treaties. 
Prior to the 1986 Single European Act most EU legislation was passed under the consultation procedure. 
Under this procedure Commission proposals required Council approval for adoption. The Council 
decided mostly by unanimity. The EP was merely consulted in the procedure. The SEA introduced two 
procedures that essentially gave the EP a veto right, the cooperation and assent procedures. More 
importantly QMV, which was rarely used prior to the SEA, became more common in the Council.1 The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced the codecision procedure. Under this procedure the EP could not only veto 
legislation, but also amend it together with a qualified majority in the Council. Subsequent Treaties 
extended the use of QMV and codecision. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty also modified the codecision 
procedure.2 
While the Lisbon Treaty left the appointment process essentially unaltered, the extension of 
codecision to some key policy areas, such as external border controls, asylum, immigration, and judicial 
and police cooperation, may have had an impact on the Commission's appointment. The Lisbon Treaty 
made codecision the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). 
In the legislative process the Commission is an agent that is important in two distinct ways. First, 
as mentioned above, the Commission is the agenda setter. Second, it specializes in the policy issues 
under consideration, and in the process it acquires information the member states and the EP do not 
have. By observing the proposal the Council and the EP can infer some of that information. The 
Commission is thus both an agenda setter and a provider of information to the member states and the 
EP. Hence, it is in the interest of the member states and the EP to take into account these two roles 
during the appointment process. 
Whereas existing models of Commission appointment assume that the member states and the EP 
have complete information in the appointment and legislative processes, we obtain novel predictions by 
modeling informational asymmetries in the legislative process. Our starting point for the incomplete 
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information model is the work by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), which in turn builds on the theory of 
strategic information transmission by Crawford and Sobel (1982).  
Most formal models that study the EU assume an exogenous Commission, i.e. the preferences of 
the Commission are fixed and unexplained (e.g. Crombez 1996; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994, 
2002). In the literature on delegation in the EU (Döring 2007; Franchino 2005, 2007; Hug 1997, 2003; 
Pollack 1997, 2003; Wonka 2007), it is argued that since the Council and the EP appoint the 
Commission, the Commission can be modeled as an agent.3 While this literature has focused on the 
agency role of the Commission as an executive, we focus on the appointment of the Commission and 
its role in the legislative process. 
Crombez (1997b) and Crombez and Hix (2011) are among the few who have put forward models 
with an endogenous Commission as a legislative agent. They use complete information models to study 
how institutional changes due to the different Treaties have had an impact on the Commission's 
appointment. They find that the introduction of QMV in the legislative process in the 1980s allowed the 
Commission to move policy further away from the status quo. Yet the unanimity requirement in the 
Commission appointment process still made it possible for the member states to commit to a legislative 
program that all of them preferred to the status quo. They conclude that the more recent move to QMV 
for appointing the Commission, combined with the ability of the member states and the EP to amend 
Commission proposals, has turned the EU into a more majoritarian political system. 
Another exception to the exogenous Commission assumption is Napel and Widgrén (2008). Their 
main finding is that in equilibrium commissioners duplicate the policy preferences of Council 
representatives. This seems to contradict empirical studies, such as by Konig et al. (2007) and 
Rasmussen (2003) that suggest that the Commission and EP exhibit a much less conflictual relationship 
than the Commission and the Council. In response Napel and Widgrén argue that the Commission’s 
internal decision rules prevent it from being a Council clone. Indeed, the Council operates under QMV, 
a supermajority rule, whereas the Commission uses simple majority. Given the use of QMV in the 
Council it can be expected to exhibit a conservative status quo bias. In contrast, the median 
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Commissioner determines the Commission’s position. The median’s preferences coincide with a 
moderate Council member under the duplication hypothesis. And because the EP also uses simple 
majority rule, the pivotal Member of the European Parliament (MEP) tends to be a like-minded political 
moderate.  
The models put forward by Crombez (1997b), Crombez and Hix (2011) and Napel and Widgrén 
(2008) study the Commission's appointment in great detail, but make the assumption that all players 
have complete information. Yet in the context of American politics Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) have 
shown that one of the main rationales for delegation to a committee is to provide incentives to specialize 
and acquire better information with regards to the consequences of policies. They construct a formal 
spatial model of a situation with one sender of a signal, a legislative committee, and one receiver, the 
United States Congress. Both the receiver and the sender care about the results of policies rather than 
the policies per se. The sender is assumed to have private information about the link between policies 
and outcomes. He makes a legislative proposal and sends it to the receiver. Two possible scenarios are 
then analyzed: an unrestrictive rule, that is, an open rule in which the receiver can amend the proposal, 
and a restrictive rule, that is, a closed rule in which the receiver can only accept the proposal without 
amendments or revert to the status quo.  
Another relevant reference is the analysis of the United Nations (UN) by Johns (2007). She 
discusses a scenario in which two principals (UN member states) with diverging preferences collectively 
appoint an agent (a UN investigator) for informational purposes. The agent provides information with 
regards to the consequences of policies, and both principals subsequently negotiate a policy outcome. 
Johns assumes that the negotiated outcome is the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. after receiving the 
agent’s message, the principals pick a policy in the middle of their preferred policies. This in effect 
reduces the two principals to a single “as-if principal” with an ideal policy halfway between the two. 
The resulting game between the “as-if principal” and the agent is identical to the unrestricted rule game 
of Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987). The conclusion is that, in the absence of outside options, both principals 
prefer to appoint an agent with an ideal policy halfway between them. 
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Our contribution is that we model the Commission’s private information in the legislative process, 
and present a model of Commission appointment in which the member states and the EP take this 
informational asymmetry into account. Our model has some similarities to Johns (2007), but is 
substantially different because the appointment and legislative processes in the EU are more structured 
than her model of the UN. In addition to our theoretical contribution we present an empirical analysis 
of Commission appointment and provide a novel account of the Spitzenkandidaten coup preceding the 
appointment of the Juncker Commission.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we develop an asymmetric 
information model of the EU’s legislative process and a model of the Commission’s appointment. In 
section three we present the legislative equilibrium, and in section four we analyze the equilibrium in 
the Commission appointment process. Section five presents data for the past eight Commissions and 
discusses the Spitzenkandidaten Coup. The final section provides the paper's main conclusions. 
We find that in the legislative process, the pivotal player(s) need to trust the Commission’s 
proposals to be willing to abandon the status quo. This requires that the appointed Commission’s 
preferences be sufficiently close to the pivotal player(s) – the pivotal member state(s) or the EP. Since 
the introduction and extension of the codecision procedure the EP plays a more important role in the 
legislative process. To the extent that the EP becomes pivotal as a result, the member states in the 
Council prefer to appoint a Commission that is relatively closer to the EP than before.  
Our theory sheds new light on the so-called Spitzenkandidaten Coup, in which the EP, according 
to some observers, forced the hand of the Council and asserted itself in the appointment of the 
Commission. We give an alternative explanation why the member states in the Council accepted a more 
prominent role for the EP in the appointment process. Under codecision the Council prefers a more 
informed EP than under consultation. Since the Treaty of Lisbon increased the use of codecision, we 
argue that under Lisbon the Council prefers a Commission that is closer to the EP than before. 
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2. The Model 
 
2.1. Players and Preferences  
The core of our model is a strategic signaling game with one sender, the Commission, and 
multiple receivers, the member states in the Council and the EP. Since we present a one-dimensional 
model, and the Commission and the EP both vote by simple majority, we model them as unitary actors, 
represented by their median voters C and P (Black, 1958). In the Council QMV is used. Hence we 
represent the Council by its left and right pivots, member states 𝐴 and 𝐵, respectively. The legislators 
𝑃, 𝐴 and 𝐵 have incomplete information on policy outcomes, whereas the median Commissioner 𝐶 has 
complete information. The actors need to reach an agreement on the policy to be implemented, based 
on 𝐶’s proposal and under either consultation or codecision.  
We assume that actors have Euclidean preferences over the outcomes of policies, not over policies 
per se. Essentially, they are outcome-oriented rather than position-oriented. In particular, actor 𝐼 ∈
{𝐶, 𝑃, 𝐴, 𝐵} with ideal outcome 𝑖 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏} derives the following utility from outcome 𝑥: 
 
𝑢𝐼(𝑥) = −(𝑥 − 𝑖)
2 (1) 
Furthermore, we assume that both the policy and outcome spaces are one-dimensional. 
Empirically, Hix et al. (2006, p.509) have shown that “Left-right politics explains an overwhelming 
proportion of voting in the EP”. The qualitative nature of our results would be unchanged with a 
multidimensional model, while the analysis and exposition would be complicated considerably.4 
 
2.2. Information 
We assume that there is asymmetric policy information to the benefit of the Commission (relative 
to the member states and the EP). Several elements here require clarification. First, by policy 
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information, we mean information on the link between policies (encoded in laws) and their real-world 
outcomes or results.5 As mentioned above actors have preferences over the results of policies, not over 
policies themselves. For instance, they do not care whether a tariff is 40% or 50% as such, but they do 
care about the consequences on imports and welfare. There is some uncertainty about how a law ℓ 
translates into an outcome 𝑥, however. This is captured by the equation: 
 
𝑥 = ℓ + 𝜔 ;     𝜔~𝑈[0,1] (2) 
Where 𝜔 ∈ Ω represents a random variable drawn from set Ω. For simplicity, we assume that 𝜔 
is uniformly distributed over the unit interval: 𝜔~𝑈[0,1], so that its expected value and variance are 
?̅? = 0.5 and 𝜎𝜔
2 = 1/12. Additionally, we follow Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) by assuming that the 
status quo policy ℓ0  is located at −1/2. If we define 𝑠 = ℓ0 +𝜔 as the “status quo outcome”, our 
assumptions on 𝜔 then imply: 
 
𝑠~𝑈 [−
1
2
,
1
2
] (3) 
So, if no legislation is adopted, the status quo outcome is distributed uniformly and symmetrically 
around the origin of the outcome space, implying that its expected value 𝑠 = 0 and 𝜎𝑠
2 = 𝜎𝜔
2 = 1/12. 
Whereas all players know the distribution of the random variable 𝜔, only the Commission knows its 
actual realization. 
As argued by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987 p. 287) in the context of the United States Congress: 
“Specialization by committees can be an efficient way for the parent body to obtain costly information 
about the consequences of alternative policies“. Our claim is that a similar relationship holds in the EU 
between the Commission and the legislative branch, the EP and the Council. In fact, we suspect this 
relationship to be even stronger in the case of the EU, since the Commission is not only the legislative 
agenda setter, but also the EU’s executive. As such it monitors the outcomes of policies and watches 
over the implementation of policies through its specialized divisions called “Directorate-Generals”. 
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Arguably this confers the Commission with superior information on the link between policies and their 
outcomes. 
Moreover, the Commission has more resources at its disposal than the EP and the Council. In 
2014 administrative spending amounted to 3,262 M€ for the Commission vs. 1,756 M€ for the EP and 
only 534 M€ for the Council (EU, 2015).6 This spending reflects the total cost of resources used, 
including the costs of staff, external experts and data acquisition. Given that its budget is larger than that 
of the EP and the Council combined, the Commission seems likely to be better informed. 
In a game between rational and forward-looking actors, asymmetric information is valuable and 
can be used strategically. However, the risk of strategic use also limits the amount of information that 
can be credibly transmitted. Crawford and Sobel (1982) studied the role of preference alignment. They 
modeled the sending of a message by an informed sender to an uninformed receiver, and showed that 
the amount of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium depends directly on the difference in 
preferences. If the sender and receiver have exactly the same preferences, information transmission is 
complete. Otherwise, the equilibrium takes the form of a partitioning of the space of the unknown 
variable. In equilibrium, the sender observes the variable and then truthfully signals to which part of the 
partition it belongs. The closer preferences are aligned, the finer the equilibrium partition is.  
 
2.3. The Legislative Process 
As discussed in the introduction, the EP has gained more rights in the legislative process, as the 
consultation procedure has gradually been nearly phased out in favor of the codecision procedure that 
gives the EP a more prominent role. We study both procedures. 
We model the legislative game as follows. Under both procedures Nature first reveals 𝜔 to the 
Commission. In the second stage the informed Commission drafts a law ℓ and offers it to the legislators. 
What happens next differs under the two procedures. Under consultation the member states then vote 
on the proposal in the third stage. If the pivotal member states 𝐴 and 𝐵, and thus a qualified majority, 
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approve it, it becomes EU policy.7 Otherwise the status quo prevails. The EP’s vote does not matter 
formally. 
Under codecision the member states and the EP can offer amendments in the third stage. For 
simplicity we assume that only one actor, the EP, offers an amendment. This simplification does not 
affect our conclusions. In the fourth stage the pivotal member states 𝐴 and 𝐵 vote on the amendment. If 
they both approve it, it is accepted. In the fifth stage the EP and the pivotal member states vote on the 
(amended) Commission proposal. If all three actors approve it, it becomes EU policy. Otherwise the 
status quo prevails.  
The appropriate solution concept for the legislative game is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE): 
sequentially rational legislators update their prior beliefs on 𝜔  upon receiving the Commission's 
proposal. Since all legislators have the same common prior 𝜔~𝑈[0,1] and receive the same signal ℓ, 
their beliefs upon hearing ℓ can be considered to be identical in equilibrium. A legislative equilibrium 
under consultation is then defined by the Commission's proposal strategy ℓ∗(𝜔), the beliefs 𝑔∗(ℓ) of 
legislators A and B, and their voting strategies 𝑣𝐼
∗(ℓ), 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} . Beliefs 𝑔(ℓ)  are defined as a 
correspondence: they give the point or interval in which 𝜔 is believed to be located with uniform density 
upon hearing proposal ℓ. Voting strategy 𝑣𝐼(ℓ) maps proposal ℓ to legislator 𝐼’s response. If legislator 
𝐼 votes yes, 𝑣𝐼 = 1; if he votes no, 𝑣𝐼 = 0.  
A legislative equilibrium under codecision is defined by the Commission's proposal strategy 
ℓ∗(𝜔), the beliefs 𝑔∗(ℓ) of legislators 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝑃, the amendment strategy 𝜆𝑃
∗ (ℓ) of the EP, the voting 
strategies 𝑤𝐼
∗(𝜆, ℓ), 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} of Council members A and B on the amendment 𝜆, and the legislators’ 
voting strategies 𝑣𝐼
∗(ℓ), 𝐼 ∈ { 𝐴, 𝐵} on the (amended) proposal.  
Under consultation there are three equilibrium conditions for 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}: (1) given 𝑣𝐼
∗(⋅), ℓ∗(⋅) 
maximizes 𝐸[𝑢𝐶]; (2) given 𝑔
∗(⋅), 𝑣𝐼
∗(. ) maximizes 𝐸[𝑢𝐼]; and (3) the beliefs 𝑔
∗(⋅) are consistent. The 
three conditions have the following interpretations: (1) the Commission has no incentive to cheat by 
sending a proposal different from the one prescribed by ℓ∗(⋅) ; (2) legislators’ voting rules 𝑣𝐼
∗(⋅) 
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maximize their expected utilities given their equilibrium beliefs about the value of 𝜔 ; and (3) in 
equilibrium the beliefs 𝑔∗(⋅) held by legislators about the value of 𝜔 are correct.  
Under codecision the conditions apply for to the EP also, i.e., they should hold for 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑃}. 
In addition, condition (2) should be modified to: given 𝑔∗(⋅), the strategies of 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑃 are mutual best 
responses, i.e. each legislator maximizes their expected utility given the others’ strategies. 𝑃’ strategy 
consists of his amendment strategy 𝜆𝑃
∗ (⋅) and his final passage voting strategy 𝑣𝑃
∗(⋅). 𝐴 and 𝐵’s strategy 
consist of their amendment voting strategies 𝑤𝐼
∗(⋅), 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵} and their final passage voting strategies 
𝑣𝐼
∗(⋅), 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. 
 
2.4. The Commission Appointment Process 
We use the simplified model of the Commission’s appointment as presented by Crombez and Hix 
(2011). First, Nature selects a member state 𝐾 that proposes a Commission with median ideal point 𝑐. 
Next, a vote is held according to the rules of the appointment process. Prior to the Maastricht Treaty the 
Commission was appointed if each member state voted in favor. From Maastricht to Nice each member 
state and the EP needed to vote in favor. Since the Nice Treaty the Commission is appointed if the EP 
and a qualified majority of member states vote in favor. For simplicity we assume that the status quo 
policy prevails if the proposed Commission is rejected. 
When thinking about potential Commissions, legislators are concerned with the policy outcomes 
that would result from each commission type 𝑐. What the member states, the EP, and the Commission 
ultimately care about is the outcome of the equilibrium policy, that is 𝑥∗ = ℓ∗ +𝜔. As will be seen 
below, the equilibrium outcome is a function of the Commission’s ideal outcome 𝑐. In our model, the 
parameter 𝑐 completely defines the Commission’s type.8 In the next section, we derive the legislative 
equilibrium as a function of 𝑐. 
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3. The Legislative Equilibrium 
 
3.1. Complete Information 
We first briefly consider the equilibrium under complete information. See also Crombez (1996, 
1997a). Under complete information the Commission proposes the policy it prefers most from among 
the policies in the win set, the range of policies that defeat the status quo in the final stage of the 
legislative procedure. Under the consultation procedure this is the set of policies a qualified majority 
prefers to the status quo. Under codecision it is the set of policies such that the EP and a qualified 
majority prefer it to the status quo, and no policy is preferred to it by the EP and a qualified majority. 
Figure 1 shows the win sets in the outcome space for two different status quo outcomes, 𝑠1 and 
𝑠2. These status quo results correspond to two different values 𝜔1 and 𝜔2 for the random variable 𝜔. 
The top part of the Figure shows the win sets under consultation, while the bottom part shows the win 
sets under codecision.  
 
** Figure 1 about here** 
 
If the status quo outcome is on the left, as is 𝑠1 in the Figure, member state 𝐴 is pivotal. Member 
state 𝐴 and all member states to its right prefer an outcome that is more to the right, and there are just 
enough such countries to meet the QMV threshold. The win set under consultation is then formed by all 
outcomes that are to the right of 𝑠1, but not further to the right than the reflection point of 𝑠1 across 
country 𝐴’s ideal outcome 𝑎. For a status quo on the right, as is 𝑠2 in the Figure, the opposite holds: 
country 𝐵 is pivotal and the win set under consultation is formed by reflecting the status quo outcome 
𝑠2 across 𝐵’s ideal 𝑏.  
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Under codecision the win sets are smaller because proposals to the left of a and to the right of b 
are successfully amended. In the Figure the EP is located between the Council’s left and right pivots. 
As a result it is never pivotal, whether the status quo outcome is to its left or right.  
 
3.2. Asymmetric Information 
We first study the equilibrium under consultation, and then under codecision, and focus on Pareto-
optimal equilibria. We assume for the exposition that 𝑝 < 𝑎 < 𝑏, i.e. the EP is a left outlier. The case 
𝑎 < 𝑏 < 𝑝 is fully analogous with the EP as a right outlier instead. If 𝑎 < 𝑝 < 𝑏, the EP’s vote is not 
pivotal with the introduction of codecision, so this case is not interesting for our purposes, although it 
can be analyzed similarly. 
 
3.2.1. Consultation 
Depending on the Commission’s location 𝑐 there are three possibilities. If 𝑎 < 𝑐 < 𝑏, both 𝐴 and 
𝐵 can be pivotal; we discuss this case below. If 𝑐 ≤ 𝑎, obtaining 𝐴’s vote does not represent a binding 
constraint for the Commission for any value of 𝜔 in equilibrium, because the proposer 𝐶 is more to the 
left. Any rightward move the Commission then wants to propose, is approved by member state 𝐴. In 
that case 𝐵 is the only relevant voter and the equilibrium is as in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987). The same 
is true for 𝑏 ≤ 𝑐, but then 𝐴 is the only relevant voter. Proposition 1 presents the equilibrium for 𝑐 ≤ 𝑎. 
The proof is in the Appendix.  
Proposition 1 Suppose consultation is used and 𝑐 ≤ 𝑎. For small and large values of 𝜔, the 
Commission then successfully proposes policies that yield its ideal outcome 𝑐. For those values of 𝜔 
where the Commission is unable to make a credible proposal, the status quo prevails. For the remaining 
intermediate values the Commission makes a proposal that signals that in expectation the proposal is 
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equally beneficial for the pivotal member state 𝐵  as is the status quo. Specifically the following 
strategies and beliefs constitute a PBE9: 
The equilibrium proposal strategy 
ℓ∗(𝜔) = {
𝑐 − 𝜔 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐
ℓ ∈ ]ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), ℓ0[ 𝑐 < 𝑠 < 2𝑏 − 𝑐
ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) 2𝑏 − 𝑐 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
𝑐 − 𝜔 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
 
The equilibrium beliefs about 𝝎 
𝑔∗(ℓ) = {
𝑐 − ℓ ℓ ≥ ℓ0 
]𝑐 − ℓ0, 2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0[ ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) < 𝑙 < ℓ0
[2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0, 4𝑏 − 3𝑐 − ℓ0] ℓ = ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐)
𝑐 − ℓ ℓ < ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐)
 
The equilibrium voting strategies 
𝑣𝐴
∗(ℓ) = 𝑣𝐵
∗ (ℓ) = 𝑣𝑃
∗(ℓ) = {
0 ℓ ∈ ]ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), ℓ0[
1 otherwise
 
The equilibrium outcome is: 
𝑥∗(𝜔) = {
𝑐 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐
𝑠 = ℓ0 +𝜔 𝑐 < 𝑠 < 2𝑏 − 𝑐
𝑠 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) 2𝑏 − 𝑐 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
𝑐 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
 
We derive the expected utilities of the actors in the Appendix. They can be characterized as 
follows: 
 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠] = −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − σω
2 [4(𝑏 − 𝑐)]3 (4) 
An illustration of the equilibrium is provided in Figure 2. In interval 𝐼 the result of the status quo 
policy is to the Commission's left. So even the left-wing Commission prefers a right-wing move, and it 
is willing to perfectly signal the value of 𝜔. Specifically, the Commission in this interval proposes the 
policy 𝑐 − 𝜔 that yields its ideal outcome. In interval 𝐼𝑉 the status quo policy yields results that are so 
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far on the right that 𝐵 prefers 𝑐 over 𝑠 = ℓ0 +𝜔. The Commission obtains its ideal policy outcome in 
this interval as well. 
 
** Figure 2 about here ** 
 
In interval 𝐼𝐼 , 𝐶  cannot successfully propose its ideal outcome 𝑐 , because in this interval 𝐵 
prefers the status quo outcome 𝑠 = ℓ0 +𝜔. In the left half of the interval, 𝐵 and the Commission want 
to move in opposite directions away from the status quo. In the right half they want to move in the same 
direction, but the Commission cannot credibly signal this, because it would pretend to be in the right 
half even if it were in the left half. The result is that in this interval the status quo prevails.  
In interval 𝐼𝐼𝐼 both the Commission and member state B prefer the Commission’s ideal policy 
outcome to the status quo outcome. The Commission cannot credibly signal this and obtain its ideal 
outcome, however, because it would pretend to be in interval 𝐼𝐼𝐼 even if it were in interval 𝐼𝐼. The best 
the Commission can do in this interval is obtain the policy illustrated in the Figure. (5) 
Proposition 2 presents the equilibrium for 𝑎 < 𝑐 < 𝑏. The proof is analogous to the proof of 
Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2 Suppose consultation is used and 𝑎 < 𝑐 < 𝑏. So, both 𝐴 and 𝐵 can be pivotal. For 
small and large values of 𝜔, the Commission successfully proposes its ideal. For those values of 𝜔 
where the Commission is unable to make a credible proposal to the left or right pivots, 𝐴  or B, 
respectively, the status quo prevails. For the remaining intermediate values the Commission makes a 
proposal that signals that in expectation the proposal is equally beneficial for the relevant pivot as is the 
status quo. In particular the following strategies and beliefs constitute a PBE10: 
The equilibrium proposal strategy 
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ℓ∗(𝜔) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑐 − 𝜔 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑎 − 3𝑐
ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑎) 4𝑎 − 3𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 2𝑎 − 𝑐
ℓ ∈]ℓ0, ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑎)[ 2𝑎 − 𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐
ℓ ∈ ]ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), ℓ0[ 𝑐 < 𝑠 < 2𝑏 − 𝑐
ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) 2𝑏 − 𝑐 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
𝑐 − 𝜔 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
 
The equilibrium beliefs about 𝝎 
𝑔∗(ℓ) =
{
  
 
  
 
𝑐 − ℓ ℓ ≥ ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑎) 
[4𝑝 − 3𝑐 − ℓ0, 2𝑝 − 𝑐 − ℓ0] ℓ = ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑎)
]2𝑝 − 𝑐 − ℓ0, 𝑐 − ℓ0] ℓ0 < ℓ < ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑎)
]𝑐 − ℓ0, 2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0[ ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) < ℓ < ℓ0
[2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0, 4𝑏 − 3𝑐 − ℓ0] ℓ = ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐)
𝑐 − ℓ ℓ < ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐)
 
The equilibrium voting strategies 
𝑣𝐴
∗(ℓ) = 𝑣𝐵
∗ (ℓ) = 𝑣𝑃
∗ = {
0  ℓ ∈ ]ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), ℓ0[ ⋃ ]ℓ0, ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑎)[ 
1 otherwise
 
The equilibrium outcome is: 
𝑥∗(𝜔) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑐 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑎 − 3𝑐
𝑠 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑎) 4𝑎 − 3𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 2𝑎 − 𝑐
𝑠 = ℓ0 +𝜔 2𝑎 − 𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 2𝑏 − 𝑐
𝑠 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) 2𝑏 − 𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
𝑐 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
 
The derivation of the expected utilities is as for Proposition 1. In particular they can be 
characterized as follows: 
 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠] = −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − σω
2 [(4(𝑏 − 𝑐))
3
+ (4(𝑐 − 𝑎))
3
] (5) 
 
3.2.2. Codecision 
As mentioned above we focus on the case 𝑝 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 in our exposition. For simplicity we assume 
that 𝑝 = −𝑏 and focus on 𝑐 ≥ 0. The equilibria with 𝑐 < 0 are symmetric. We identify four scenarios 
and show that as 𝑐 increases, information transmission decreases. In the first scenario 𝑐 = 0, and the 
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equilibrium is analogous to the consultation equilibrium in Proposition 2. As the ideal policy 𝑐 increases, 
we end up in the second, third and finally fourth scenarios. In the fourth scenario there is a pooling 
equilibrium with no information transmission. We give the full equilibrium specification for the first 
scenario, and provide intuition for the other.  
Scenario 1 Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium in the first scenario where 𝑐 =
𝑏+𝑝
2
= 0. All 
proofs can be found in the Appendix. 
Proposition 3 Suppose codecision is used and 𝑝 < 𝑎 < 𝑏, i.e. 𝑃 is the left pivot and 𝐵 is the right 
pivot for the Commission. Further suppose that 𝑐 =
𝑏+𝑝
2
= 0. For small and large values of 𝜔, the 
Commission then successfully proposes its ideal. For those values of 𝜔 where the Commission is unable 
to make a credible proposal to the left or right pivots, 𝑃 or B, the status quo prevails. For the remaining 
intermediate values the Commission makes a proposal that signals that in expectation the proposal is 
equally beneficial for the relevant pivot as is the status quo. The following strategies and beliefs 
constitute a PBE11: 
The equilibrium proposal strategy 
ℓ∗(𝜔) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑐 − 𝜔 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑝 − 3𝑐
ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝) 4𝑝 − 3𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 2𝑝 − 𝑐
ℓ ∈]ℓ0, ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝)[ 2𝑝 − 𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐
ℓ ∈ ]ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), ℓ0[ 𝑐 < 𝑠 < 2𝑏 − 𝑐
ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) 2𝑏 − 𝑐 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
𝑐 − 𝜔 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
 
The equilibrium beliefs about 𝝎 
𝑔∗(ℓ) =
{
  
 
  
 
𝑐 − ℓ ℓ ≥ ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝) 
[4𝑝 − 3𝑐 − ℓ0, 2𝑝 − 𝑐 − ℓ0] ℓ = ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝)
]2𝑝 − 𝑐 − ℓ0, 𝑐 − ℓ0] ℓ0 < ℓ < ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝)
]𝑐 − ℓ0, 2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0[ ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) < ℓ < ℓ0
[2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0, 4𝑏 − 3𝑐 − ℓ0] ℓ = ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐)
𝑐 − ℓ ℓ < ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐)
 
The equilibrium amendment strategies 
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𝜆𝑃
∗ (ℓ): if in any belief interval the expected outcome of the Commission’s proposal ℓ is outside 
of [𝑝, 𝑏], propose the amendment that has expected outcome closest to 𝑝 and is acceptable to 𝐵. 
𝑤𝐼
∗(𝜆, ℓ), 𝐼 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}: in any belief interval, accept an amendment 𝜆 if its expected outcome is 
closer to 𝑖 than the expected outcome of the Commission’s proposal ℓ. 
The equilibrium voting strategies 
𝑣𝐴
∗(ℓ) = 𝑣𝐵
∗ (ℓ) = 𝑣𝑃
∗ = {
0  ℓ ∈ ]ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), ℓ0[ ⋃ ]ℓ0, ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝)[ 
1 otherwise
 
The equilibrium outcome is: 
𝑥∗(𝜔) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑐 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑝 − 3𝑐
𝑠 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝) 4𝑝 − 3𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 2𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑠 = ℓ0 +𝜔 2𝑝 − 𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 2𝑏 − 𝑐
𝑠 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) 2𝑏 − 𝑐 < 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
𝑐 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐
 
We derive the expected utilities in the Appendix. In particular they can be characterized as follows: 
 𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − 𝜎𝜔
2 [(4(𝑐 − 𝑝))
3
+ (4(𝑏 − 𝑐))
3
] 
= −(
𝑏 − 𝑝
2
)
2
− 16𝜎𝜔
2(𝑏 − 𝑝)3 
(6) 
The interpretation of this equilibrium is similar to the interpretation of the equilibrium under 
consultation defined in Proposition 1. The difference is that here there are two pivotal legislators instead 
of one. An illustration of the equilibrium is provided in Figure 3.  
 
**Figure 3 about here** 
 
The interpretation of intervals 𝐼, 𝐼𝑉, 𝑉  and 𝑉𝐼  is the same as in the corresponding intervals 
𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝐼𝑉 in Figure 2. In interval 𝐼𝐼 (𝐼𝐼𝐼) the reasoning is similar to that in interval 𝑉 (𝐼𝑉).   
Scenario 2 If 𝑝 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 and a Commission is appointed with 
𝑏+𝑝
2
≤ 𝑐 ≤
8𝑝+4𝑏+0.5
11
, we end up 
in the second scenario. Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium for this scenario. The Commission is farther 
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away from the EP than it is in scenario 1. As a result it cannot credibly transmit as much information to 
the EP, and intervals IV and V, where the Commission does not obtain its ideal outcome, are larger than 
their equivalent intervals in Figure 3. Moreover there are two extra intervals, intervals 𝐼𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼𝐼. In 
scenario 1 these two intervals are part of interval 𝐼. Under scenario 2 the Commission cannot obtain its 
ideal outcome in these intervals, however. In interval III it proposes the same policy as in interval IV, 
because otherwise member state B would amend the Commission’s proposal in interval IV. In 
equilibrium there are no amendments. In interval II the Commission cannot obtain its ideal outcome 
either, because it would then pretend to be in interval 𝐼𝐼 when it is in interval 𝐼𝐼𝐼.  
 
**Figure 4 about here** 
 
We derive the expected utilities in the Appendix. They can be characterized as follows: 
 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − 𝜎𝜔
2 [(4(𝑐 − 𝑝))
3
+ (4(𝑏 − 𝑐))
3
+ (4(2𝑐 − 𝑝 − 𝑏))
3
] (7) 
There is more information pooling in scenario 2 than there is in scenario 1. This leads to more 
variation in the outcomes, and is reflected in the extra term −𝜎𝜔
2(4(2𝑐 − 𝑝 − 𝑏))
3
 in the expected 
utilities of the legislators.  
Scenario 3 If 𝑝 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 and 
8𝑝+4𝑏+0.5
11
< 𝑐 ≤
6𝑝+2𝑏+0.5
7
, we end up in the third scenario. In this 
scenario the Commission is so far away from member state A that it cannot move policy far enough to 
the right to obtain its ideal outcome. As a result intervals 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼 from Figure 4 disappear under this 
scenario. The expected utilities can be characterized as follows: 
 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −[0.5 − 4p + 3c](𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − [0.5 + 4𝑝 − 3𝑐](−0.25 − 2𝑝 + 2.5𝑐 − 𝑖)2 
= −𝜎𝜔
2 [(4(𝑐 − 𝑝))
3
+ (4(𝑏 − 𝑐))
3
+ (4(0.125 + 𝑝 − 0.75𝑐))
3
] 
(8) 
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Scenario 4. If 𝑝 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 and 𝑐 >
6𝑝+2𝑏+0.5
7
, we end up in the fourth scenario. The Commission 
is so far away that there is no more information transmission. There is a pure pooling equilibrium, and 
the status quo prevails. The expected utilities then are: 
 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −𝑖2 − 𝜎𝜔
2  (9) 
 
4. The Commission Appointment Equilibrium 
We first briefly consider Commission appointment under complete information, as studied by 
Crombez and Hix (2011). In simplified one-dimensional versions of these multi-dimensional models, 
any Commission successfully proposes the policy it prefers most from among the policies in the win 
set, as seen above. For that reason the member state that gets to propose the Commission median 𝑐 can 
do no better than to choose a 𝐶 with ideal policy equal to its own, whether consultation or codecision is 
used in the legislative process. Given the absence of binding changes to the Commission's appointment 
process, the Lisbon Treaty thus has no impact on the type of Commission that is appointed in a complete 
information world.  
In the remainder of this section we study how asymmetric information in the legislative process 
shapes the preferences of legislators with regards to the type of Commission they appoint. We show 
that, as the codecision procedure is used more often, preferences over the Commission’s type shift in 
the direction of the median MEP’s ideal 𝑝. 
Figure 5 illustrates the legislators’ expected utilities as a function of the location of the 
Commission. The utilities under consultation are represented in the upper part of the Figure, whereas 
those under codecision are in the lower part. In the Figure the median MEP is the left pivot, i.e. 𝑝 < 𝑎. 
In particular 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 0.05 and 𝑝 = −0.05.  
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** Figure 5 about here ** 
 
Country B’s utility function is indicated by a solid line, Country 𝐴’s by a grey dotted line and the 
median MEP's by a dashed line. The horizontal axis shows the median Commissioner’s ideal point 𝑐, 
whereas the vertical axis reflects expected utilities. As the legislative procedure shifts from consultation 
to codecision, the ideal Commissions of member states A and B shift toward p, because the EP becomes 
pivotal, and toward a moderate Commission with ideal policy outcome 
𝑏+𝑝
2
, because extreme 
Commissions pool more information to prevent amendments. One can see this illustrated in Figure 5 or 
directly from the expected utility functions provided in the previous section. 
Actor 𝐼’s ideal Commission under consultation is the maximizer of its expected utility function. 
The utility functions are the composite of (4) for 𝑐 ≤ 𝑎 and (5) for 𝑎 < 𝑐 < 𝑏. From these functions, 
one can see that the ideal Commission of legislator 𝐼 reflects both the Commission’s 
distributional/agenda-setting role (presence of (𝑐 − 𝑖)2 in the expressions) and its informational role 
(presence of the second terms starting with 𝜎𝜔
2 ). In a complete information model, only the distributional 
role matters and legislator 𝐼 prefers 𝑐 = 𝑖 . In the presence of private Commission information, a 
Commission away from the pivotal player(s) leads to decreased information transmission and inefficient 
variation of the outcomes. This has a moderating effect on legislators’ ideal commissions. 
The top of Figure 5 illustrates the Commission’s two conflicting roles. On the one hand 𝐶 
proposes a policy and legislator 𝐼 likes this policy to be closer to its ideal 𝑖. This creates a desire to 
appoint a Commission that is close to 𝑖 . On the other hand, the Commission's proposals provide 
information to the pivotal player(s) 𝐵 (if 𝑐 ≤ 𝑎) or 𝐵 and 𝐴 (if 𝑐 > 𝑎). The further 𝐶 is from the pivotal 
player(s), the lower the information transmission is in equilibrium. This moderates the incentive to 
appoint an extreme Commission. 
The bottom of Figure 5 is more complex. The discontinuous jumps in expected utility reflect the 
changing nature of the codecision equilibrium as 𝑐 changes from scenario 1 to scenario 4. As we have 
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shown in the previous section, equilibrium information transmission decreases as 𝑐  becomes more 
extreme. Note that since 𝑝 = −𝑏, the utilities for 𝑃 and 𝐵 are mirror images of each other. 
Under codecision the median MEP must approve proposals to get them adopted. Therefore both 
the member states and the EP prefer the EP to be more informed. In addition, the potential for 
amendments under codecision gives all legislators an incentive to appoint a Commission close to 
𝑏+𝑝
2
. 
More extreme Commissions would pool more information to prevent amendments, leading to inefficient 
variations in outcomes. Both appointing bodies thus prefer the other to be well informed over having a 
Commission that perfectly corresponds to their own ideal outcomes. As under consultation, 
informational incompleteness has a moderating effect. 
Given the expected utilities from each Commission type 𝑐, deriving the appointment equilibrium 
is easy. The member state selected to propose the Commission median 𝑐  will propose its utility-
maximizing Commission, which takes into account the informational cost if it appoints an extreme 
Commission. The proposed Commission will always be accepted: rejecting it leads to the status quo 
policy prevailing, with a high variance in outcomes and the same minimal utilities as in a pure pooling 
equilibrium.  
The shift in ideal Commissions hence implies that, in the presence of incomplete information, the 
Lisbon Treaty does have an impact on the appointed Commission – even in the absence of binding 
changes to the appointment procedure. The equilibrium Commission changes because the increased use 
of codecision makes it more important for all legislators that the median MEP trusts the Commission so 
that information can be transmitted in equilibrium. This is achieved by appointing a Commission that is 
relatively closer to 𝑃. In addition, the country selected to propose a Commission has an incentive to 
appoint a Commission close to 
𝑏+𝑝
2
 because of the potential for amendments. Our findings are 
summarized in Proposition 3 and its Corollary. 
Proposition 3 Under incomplete policy information the member states and the EP have incentives 
to appoint a Commission that is closer to the EP and the midpoint between the EP’s position and that of 
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the pivotal member state when codecision is used in the legislative process than when consultation is 
used. 
Corollary Since the Lisbon Treaty has expanded the use of codecision, Commissions appointed 
under the Lisbon Treaty are likely to have ideal outcomes 𝑐 closer to the EP’s median ideal outcomes 
𝑝, for given EP and member state preferences, and for a given proposer in the appointment process. 
 
5. Recent Commissions 
In this section we discuss how the empirical reality corresponds with our theory. Given the limited 
number of appointed Commissions since Lisbon, no statistically significant analyses are possible. First, 
we discuss how our theory sheds an interesting light on the so-called “Spitzenkandidaten Coup”. 
Second, we study how the ideological positions of EU actors fit with our theory for the past eight 
Commissions.  
 
5.1. The Spitzenkandidaten Coup 
“Klaus Welle (…) [and] Martin Schulz (…) worked to stretch to the widest limit the key – and, 
crucially, loose – wording in the EU Treaty on choosing the next European Commission 
president. The new rules – saying the commission president should be chosen “taking into 
account” the European election results – were to be applied for the first time in the May EU 
elections. But while member states read the article and assumed a happy continuation of the 
practice of yesteryear - a behind-closed-doors huddle of EU leaders to pick a president who 
ruffled the fewest feathers - the parliament had very different ideas.” (H. Mahony in EU 
Observer, 4 Jan. 2015) 
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Our theory offers an interesting perspective on the appointment of the Juncker Commission, and 
more specifically the way in which Juncker was nominated as President of the Commissionin 2014. In 
the press the proceedings have been described as the Spitzenkandidaten Coup (Mahony, 2015). As The 
Economist wrote: “In a dubious attempt to make the EU more democratic, the main political groups in 
the European Parliament have decided to promote “lead candidates” (most use the German term, 
Spitzenkandidaten) for the presidency of the powerful European Commission” (Economist, 2014). 
Juncker was the candidate put forward by the European People’s Party (EPP), which emerged as the 
largest party from the 2014 EP election. In spite of British resistance the Council indeed nominated 
Juncker, who was then approved by the EP. 
Our theory comports well with the fact that the Council ultimately seems to have accepted the 
system of the Spitzenkandidaten.12 Indeed, we have shown that, irrespective of whether the Lisbon 
Treaty did or did not change the appointment procedure, the increased use of codecision means that the 
legislators have incentives to appoint a Commission that is closer to the EP. This could explain why the 
member states accepted the EP’s “coup”. The coup was not a coup at all, but rather an evolution in the 
appointment process that was in the interest of the EP as well as the member states. 
More generally, our theory is an example of how preferences and rules combine to generate 
outcomes. When studying political decisions, commentators sometimes overemphasize the role of rules 
and neglect preferences, which may have a countervailing or reinforcing effect.  
 
5.2. Data  
In this section, we look at data on ideal policies for the past eight Commissions: Delors I (1985-
1989), Delors II (1989-1993), Delors III (1993-1995), Santer (1995-1999), Prodi (1999-2004), Barrosso 
I (2004-2009), Barrosso II (2009-2014), Juncker (2014-present). In particular, we look at the position 
of the actors in our model on a left-right scale. The data for the Commissions Delors, Santer, Prodi and 
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Barrosso I were taken from Crombez and Hix (2015). The data for Barrosso II and Juncker were derived 
from the same source data and using the same methods.  
While Crombez and Hix (2015) provide an in-depth data description, we provide the most 
important information only as far as it is needed to reconstruct the data. The source of the data is the 
ParlGov dataset, which contains information on party and government compositions (Döring and 
Manow 2014; see parlgov.org).13 We use the variable “left_right”, which estimates the positions of 
political parties on a 0-10 left-right scale. For each Commission we determine the positions of the EP 
and member states just after the EP elections. 
First, we compute the position of the pivotal players 𝐴 and 𝐵 in the Council. We assume that each 
country’s position corresponds well to the positions of the parties in government, weighted by their 
number of seats in the national government cabinet. The pivotal players are then determined using the 
appropriate QMV threshold. For the EP we assume that the position of each MEP corresponds well to 
the position of their national party. 𝑃 is the position of the median MEP. For the Commission we assume 
that the position of each Commissioner corresponds well to the position of his national party.14 The 
position of 𝐶 is the median of Commissioner positions. The results are represented in Table 2. 
 
** Table 2 about here** 
 
Given the frequent and gradual institutional changes in the EU, care needs to be taken when 
interpreting the data in Table 2. Our theory is about the change from consultation to codecision, and the 
impact this has on legislators’ preferences over Commission types. Codecision was introduced with the 
Maastricht Treaty (first affecting the Santer Commission), and its use was increased until it was made 
the OLP in the Lisbon Treaty (first affecting the Juncker Commission).  
Our theory predicts that over time, ceteris paribus, the legislators’ ideal Commissions have shifted 
in the direction of the EP. The problem with interpreting the data is the ceteris paribus qualifier: there 
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are two types of changes other than the move from consultation to codecision. First, legislators’ absolute 
and relative positions have changed across legislatures. Second, the appointment rules have also 
changed.  
Two additional elements should be taken into account when interpreting the results. First, the data 
are prone to measurement errors and all usual caveats related to expert judgments. Second, the ideal 
Commission of each legislator depends not only on legislators’ left-right positions, but also on the 
severity of the information problem. In our model, we have standardized 𝜔  to have a uniform 
distribution over [0,1]. Empirically, no estimates are available about the actual variance of 𝜔.  
Due to all of these concerns, it is very hard to draw conclusions from the empirical evidence, 
especially given the limited number of observations. The only thing that is clear from Table 2 is that the 
appointed Commission is always in the support of the pivotal legislators. In models with complete 
information, Commissions outside of this support could also be appointed, although they would be 
equivalent to Commissions on the boundary (Crombez and Hix 2011). In our model, informational 
concerns generate moderating effects on each legislator’s preferred Commission. Hence the observation 
that appointed Commissions are always in the support of the pivotal legislators is consistent with our 
theory. 
Looking at Table 2, one clear contrast is between the Commissions Delors III (1993-1995) and 
Santer (1995-1999). For these two Commissions, the relative positions of 𝑎, 𝑝, 𝑏 are the same as in the 
exposition of our results: 𝑝 < 𝑎 < 𝑏. Comparing Delors III and Santer, the appointed Commission 
shifted dramatically in the direction of the EP. With the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, the EP gained 
a veto over the entire Commission – a plausible explanation for the shift in the EP’s direction. However, 
an alternative (and complementary) explanation is the fact that with Maastricht the codecision procedure 
was introduced. As we have argued, informational concerns produce a shift in the direction of the EP as 
consultation is replaced with codecision. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper looks into the impact of the legislative procedure on legislators’ preferences in the 
Commission’s appointment and the resulting appointment equilibrium. We find that, even though the 
Lisbon Treaty does not impose binding changes in the appointment procedure, future Commissions are 
likely to better reflect the EP's preferences versus before the introduction and extension of codecision. 
The intuition behind this result is that legislators, the EP and the member states, need information 
to make decisions. They obtain information about the consequences of policy from the Commission's 
proposals. The Commission thus fulfills a double role: it is both an agenda setter and an information 
provider. If the ideological difference between a given legislator and the Commission is large, that 
legislator will not easily trust the Commission’s information and the informational efficiency of the 
legislative equilibrium will be hampered. Under consultation only the Council votes on the 
Commission's proposals and therefore only the member states require information to defeat the status 
quo. Both the EP and the member states thus prefer a more informed Council over a less informed one. 
The Lisbon Treaty expands the use of the codecision procedure. As a result, both the EP and the member 
states prefer a relatively more informed EP versus before and hence a Commission closer to the EP than 
under consultation. 
The available empirical evidence, while scarce and difficult to interpret, is consistent with our 
theory. In addition, our theory may explain why the member states accepted the so-called 
Spitzenkandidaten Coup during the appointment of the Juncker Commission in 2014. In this “coup”, the 
EP claimed more rights in the appointment process than granted by the Treaties. Rather than an 
exogenous power grab by the EP, this event may simply reflect that under codecision the member states 
also want the EP to be informed. This requires a Commission that reflects the EP’s preferences better 
than it did before the introduction and extension of codecision. 
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8. Tables and Figures  
Table 1. EU reforms and their impact on EP rights in the legislative process and Commission appointment. 
Treaty Effect Legislative process Commission appointment Commissions 
Pre-SEA  Consultation 
Council appoints by common 
accord 
 
SEA15 1987 
Introduction of cooperation and 
assent (EP veto), and QMV 
- 
Delors II (89-93) 
Delors III (93-95) 
Maastricht 1993 
Introduction of codecision and 
increased use of QMV 
EP gains veto on Commission Santer (95-99) 
Amsterdam 1999 
Increased use of codecision and 
QMV, and modification of the 
former 
EP gains veto on Commission 
President 
Prodi (99-04) 
Nice 2003 
Increased use of codecision and 
QMV 
Council nominates by QMV 
Barroso I (04-09) 
Barroso II (09-14) 
Lisbon 2009 
Increased use of codecision (now 
OLP) and QMV 
Council nominates “taking into 
account” EP elections 
Juncker (14-…) 
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Figure 1. Win sets under consultation and codecision. 
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Figure 2. Legislative equilibrium under consultation, 𝑐 ≤ 𝑎 so that only 𝐵 is pivotal. 
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Figure 3. Legislative equilibrium under codecision scenario 1. 
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Figure 4. Legislative equilibrium under codecision scenario 2. 
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Figure 5. Expected utilities and ideal points under consultation and codecision. 
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Table 2. Left-right positions of EU actors on a 0-10 scale. 
 𝒑 𝒂 𝒃 𝑺 𝒄 
Commission 
EP 
median 
Council  
Left Pivot 
Council 
Right Pivot 
Support 
of pivotal 
legislators16 
Commission 
median 
Delors I 5.7 3.3 7.3 (3.3,7.3) 5.7 
Delors II 5.7 4.3 6.6 (4.3,6.6) 5.8 
Delors III 4.3 4.7 6.4 (4.7, 6.4) 6 
Santer 4.2 4.9 6.9 (4.2, 6.9) 4.3 
Prodi 4.8 3.5 4.7 (3.5, 4.8) 4.2 
Barrosso I 5.8 3.7 6.4 (3.7, 6.4)  5.7 
Barrosso II 6.0 4.4 7.2 (4.4, 7.2) 6.3 
Juncker 6.0 3.4 6.3 (3.4, 6.3) 6.3 
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9. Appendix 
 
9.1. Lemma 1 
Lemma 1 (Euclidean utility with symmetric outcomes). Assume agent 𝐼 has ideal outcome 𝑖 and 
derives Euclidean utility from outcomes 𝑥, so that 𝐸[𝑢𝐼] = 𝐸[−(𝑥 − 𝑖)
2]. Further assume that over an 
interval of width 𝑑, outcomes have slope 1 and are symmetric around outcome 𝛼. Define 𝜔~𝑈[0,1] so 
that 𝜎𝜔
2 =
1
12
. Then 𝐸[𝑢𝐼] = −𝑑(𝑖 − 𝛼)
2−𝜎𝜔
2𝑑3 , i.e. the expected utility has two components: (i) a 
penalty for the distance between the ideal outcome and the average outcome, proportional to 𝑑 and to 
(𝑖 − 𝛼)2 and (ii) a penalty for the variation of the outcome, proportional to 𝑑3. 
Proof of Lemma 1 
∫ −(𝑥 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑥 = ∫ −(𝑥 − (𝑖 − 𝛼))
2
𝑑𝑥
𝑑/2
−𝑑/2
𝛼+𝑑/2
𝛼−𝑑/2
= −[
𝑥3
3
− 𝑥2(𝑖 − 𝛼) + 𝑥(𝑖 − 𝛼)2]
𝑥=−𝑑/2
𝑑/2
 
= −
𝑑3
12
− 𝑑(𝑖 − 𝛼)2 = −𝑑(𝑖 − 𝛼)2 − 𝜎𝜔
2𝑑3  [QED] 
 
9.2. Proof of Proposition 1 [consultation with one pivotal voter] 
There are three equilibrium conditions (based on Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987 p.330): (1) given 
𝑣𝐼
∗(⋅), ℓ∗(⋅) maximizes 𝐸[𝑢𝐶]; (2) given 𝑔
∗(⋅), 𝑣𝐼
∗(⋅) maximizes 𝐸[𝑢𝐼]; and (3) the beliefs 𝑔
∗(⋅) are 
consistent. 
Crawford and Sobel (1982, p.1437) show that for (1), it is necessary and sufficient that the 
proposer be indifferent at the boundary points between intervals. In the proposed equilibrium, the 
equilibrium outcome has only one jump at 𝑠 = 2𝑏 − 𝑐; it jumps from 2𝑏 − 𝑐 to 2𝑏 − 𝑐 − 4𝑏 − 4𝑐 =
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−2𝑏 + 3𝑐 . Since 2𝑏 − 𝑐  is symmetrically across 𝑐  from −2𝑏 + 3𝑐 , it is clear that 𝑢𝐶(2𝑏 − 𝑐) =
𝑢𝐶(−2𝑏 + 3𝑐), which proves (1). 
For (2), we prove that it is optimal for legislator 𝐼 to vote as in the proposed equilibrium. Under 
consultation, 𝑃’s vote has no impact so he is indifferent between voting yes or no. Hence we need to 
show optimality only for 𝐼 = {𝐴, 𝐵}: 
 For ℓ ≥ ℓ0 or ℓ < ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), 𝑔
∗(ℓ) = ℓ0 + 𝑐 − ℓ which implies 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐 or 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐. It 
is optimal to accept (𝑣𝐼
∗(ℓ) = 1) since under the equilibrium beliefs 𝑢𝐼(𝑐) ≥ 𝑢𝐼(𝑠). 
 For ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) < 𝑙 < ℓ0 , 𝑔
∗(ℓ) =]𝑐 − ℓ0, 2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0[ and it is optimal for B to reject 
(𝑣𝐵
∗ (ℓ) = 0), given that the status quo ℓ0 maximizes ∫ −(ℓ + 𝜔 − 𝑏)
2𝑑𝜔
2𝑏−𝑐−ℓ0
𝑐−ℓ0
 as a function 
of ℓ. Given B’s rejection, A’s vote is indifferent. 
 For ℓ = ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) , 𝑔
∗(ℓ) = [2𝑏 − 𝑐 − ℓ0, 4𝑏 − 3𝑐 − ℓ0]  and ∫ −(𝑠 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) −
4𝑏−3𝑐
2𝑏−𝑐
𝑖)2𝑑𝑠 ≥ ∫ −(𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
4𝑏−3𝑐
2𝑏−𝑐
 with equality for 𝐼 = 𝐵 and strict inequality for A. 
Condition (3) is fulfilled since the equilibrium beliefs have been specified as 𝑔∗(ℓ) =
{𝜔|ℓ = ℓ∗(𝜔)}. 
Since conditions (1), (2) and (3) are satisfied, the proposed combination of strategies and beliefs 
constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.  [QED] 
9.2.1. Utility under Proposition 1 [consultation with one pivotal voter] 
We integrate expected values over 𝑠~𝑈[−0.5,0.5] instead of over 𝜔~[0,1]. For utility under 
Proposition 2, the derivation is similar to Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, p.333). Our Lemma 1 facilitates 
the computations and interpretation. 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠] = 𝐸[−(𝑥 − 𝑖)2] = 𝐸[−(𝑥 − 𝑖)2] 
= −∫ (𝑐 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
𝑐
−0.5
−∫ (𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠 − ∫ (𝑠 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) − 𝑖)2
4𝑏−3𝑐
2𝑏−𝑐
𝑑𝑠 − ∫ (𝑐 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
0.5
4𝑏−3𝑐
2𝑏−𝑐
𝑐
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= −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2[𝑐 + 0.5 + 0.5 − 4𝑏 + 3𝑐] − ∫ (𝑠 − 𝑖)2
2𝑏−𝑐
−2𝑏+3𝑐
𝑑𝑠 
By applying Lemma 1 to the last term, 
= −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2[1 − 4𝑏 + 4𝑐] − (𝑐 − 𝑖)2[4𝑏 − 4𝑐] − σω
2 [4(𝑏 − 𝑐)]3  
= −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − σω
2 [4(𝑏 − 𝑐)]3 = −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 −
16
3
(𝑏 − 𝑐)3 
 
9.3. Proof of Proposition 3 [codecision Scenario 1] 
The equilibrium conditions are the same as for Proposition 1, augmented for 𝑃 and for optimality 
of the amendment strategies. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 since in equilibrium no 
amendments will be proposed. 
In the proposed equilibrium, the outcome has two jumps: one at 𝑠 = 2𝑝 − 𝑐 and one at 𝑠 = 2𝑏 −
𝑐. The outcome jumps from −2𝑝 + 3𝑐 to 2𝑝 − 𝑐, and from 2𝑏 − 𝑐 to −2𝑏 + 3𝑐. Since both jumps are 
symmetric across 𝑐, the Commission has no incentive to cheat, which proves (1). 
For condition (2), we first show that no amendments will be proposed in equilibrium. In intervals 
𝐼 and 𝑉𝐼, the outcome is equal to 𝑐, which is clearly in the Conciliation Committee gridlock interval. 
For the remaining belief intervals, the expected outcome is also always in the gridlock interval: it is 
exactly 𝑏 in intervals 𝐼𝐼 and 𝐼𝑉, and exactly 𝑝 in intervals 𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝑉. This is also the reason why the 
equilibrium is only valid for 𝑐 =
𝑏+𝑝
2
. Otherwise the expected outcome in belief interval 𝐼𝐼 or 𝑉 would 
be outside of the Conciliation Committee gridlock interval [𝑝, 𝑏]. 
To finish the proof of (2), we prove that it is optimal for legislator 𝐼 to vote as in the proposed 
equilibrium. Under codecision, we need to show optimality for 𝐼 = {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑃}: 
 For ℓ ≥ ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝) or ℓ < ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐), 𝑔
∗(ℓ) = 𝑐 + ℓ0 − ℓ which implies 𝑠 ≤ 4𝑝 − 3𝑐 
or 𝑠 > 4𝑏 − 3𝑐. It is optimal to accept (𝑣𝐼
∗(ℓ) = 1) since under the equilibrium beliefs 𝑑(𝑐, 𝑖) ≤
𝑑(𝑠, 𝑖).  
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 For ℓ = ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝) , 𝑔
∗(ℓ) = [4𝑝 − 3𝑐, 2𝑝 − 𝑐]  and ∫ −(𝑠 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝) − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
2𝑝−𝑐
4𝑝−3𝑐
≥
∫ −(𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
2𝑝−𝑐
4𝑝−3𝑐
 with equality for 𝐼 = 𝑃 and strict inequality for 𝐴 and 𝐵. 
 For ℓ0 < 𝑙 < ℓ0 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝), 𝑔
∗(ℓ) =]2𝑝 − 𝑐, 𝑐] and it is optimal for 𝑃 to reject (𝑣𝑃
∗(ℓ) = 0), 
given that the status quo ℓ0 maximizes ∫ −(ℓ + 𝜔 − 𝑝)
2𝑑𝜔
𝑐−ℓ0
2𝑝−𝑐−ℓ0
 as a function of ℓ. Given 
𝑃’s rejection, 𝐴 and 𝐵’s vote are indifferent. 
 For ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) < 𝑙 < ℓ0, 𝑔
∗(ℓ) =]𝑐, 2𝑏 − 𝑐[ and it is optimal for 𝐵 to reject (𝑣𝐵
∗ (ℓ) = 0), 
given that the status quo ℓ0 maximizes ∫ −(ℓ + 𝜔 − 𝑏)
2𝑑𝜔
2𝑏−𝑐−ℓ0
𝑐−ℓ0
 as a function of ℓ. Given 
𝐵’s rejection, 𝐴 and 𝑃’s vote are indifferent. 
 For ℓ = ℓ0 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) , 𝑔
∗(ℓ) = [2𝑏 − 𝑐, 4𝑏 − 3𝑐]  and ∫ −(𝑠 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
4𝑏−3𝑐
2𝑏−𝑐
≥
∫ −(𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
4𝑏−3𝑐
2𝑏−𝑐
 with equality for 𝐼 = 𝐵 and strict inequality for 𝐴 and 𝑃. 
Condition (3) is fulfilled since the equilibrium beliefs have been specified such that 𝑔∗(ℓ) =
{𝜔|ℓ = ℓ∗(𝜔)}. 
9.3.1. Utility under Proposition 3 [codecision Scenario 1] 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = 𝐸[−(𝑥 − 𝑖)2] = −𝐸[(𝑥 − 𝑖)2] 
= −∫ (𝑐 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠 − ∫ (𝑠 + 4(𝑐 − 𝑝) − 𝑖)2
2𝑝−𝑐
4𝑝−3𝑐
𝑑𝑠 − ∫ (𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
𝑐
2𝑝−𝑐
4𝑝−3𝑐
−0.5
−∫ (𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
2𝑏−𝑐
𝑐
 
     −∫ (𝑠 − 4(𝑏 − 𝑐) − 𝑖)2
4𝑏−3𝑐
2𝑏−𝑐
𝑑𝑠 − ∫ (𝑐 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
0.5
4𝑏−3𝑐
 
= −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2(1 + 4𝑝 − 4𝑏) − ∫ (𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
−2𝑝+3𝑐
2𝑝−𝑐
−∫ (𝑠 − 𝑖)2𝑑𝑠
2𝑏−𝑐
−2𝑏+3𝑐
 
By applying Lemma 1, we find: 
 𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − 𝜎𝜔
2 [(4(𝑐 − 𝑝))
3
+ (4(𝑏 − 𝑐))
3
] 
Given that 𝑐 =
𝑏+𝑝
2
, this reduces to: 𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −(
𝑏−𝑝
2
)
2
− 16𝜎𝜔
2(𝑏 − 𝑝)3. 
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9.4. Codecision Scenario 2 
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3; we omit the fully analogous steps. The 
structure of this equilibrium is such that the expected outcome over belief interval 𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝑉 is just within 
the Conciliation Committee gridlock interval, i.e. in [𝑏, 𝑝]. Indeed, it is easy to check that the middle of 
[6𝑝 − 7𝑐 + 2𝑏, 2𝑝 − 𝑐] is [4𝑝 − 4𝑐 + 𝑏], and that the outcome at this point is 4𝑝 − 4𝑐 + 𝑏 + 4𝑐 −
4𝑝 = 𝑏. 
For the equilibrium to be valid, the starting point of interval 𝐼𝐼 has to be greater than −0.5. That 
is: 8𝑝 − 11𝑐 + 4𝑏 ≥ −0.5 ⇔ 𝑐 ≤
8𝑝+4𝑏+0.5
11
. 
9.4.1. Utility in Scenario 2 
The overall expected outcome is 𝑐. As under Proposition 2, Lemma 1 can be applied to the 
intervals 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝑉 − 𝑉  and 𝑉𝐼 − 𝑉𝐼𝐼 . The result is 𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −(𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − 𝜎𝜔
2 [(4(𝑐 − 𝑝))
3
+
(4(𝑏 − 𝑐))
3
+ (4(2𝑐 − 𝑝 − 𝑏))
3
]. 
 
9.5. Codecision Scenario 3 
The proof is again analogous to the proof of Proposition 3. For this equilibrium to be valid, the 
expected outcome over belief interval 𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼  has to be within the Conciliation Committee gridlock 
interval, i.e. in [𝑏, 𝑝]. The middle of [−0.5,2𝑝 − 𝑐] is −0.25 + 𝑝 − 0.5𝑐, and the outcome at this point 
is −0.25 + 𝑝 − 0.5𝑐 + 4𝑐 − 4𝑝 = −0.25 − 3𝑝 + 3.5𝑐. For this outcome to be within [𝑝, 𝑏], it has to 
be the case that −0.25 − 3𝑝 + 3.5𝑐 ≤ 𝑏 ⇔ 𝑐 ≤
6𝑝+2𝑏+0.5
7
. 
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9.5.1. Utility in Scenario 3 
The expected outcome is 𝑐  over intervals 𝐼𝐼 − 𝑉𝐼 . Over interval 𝐼 , the expected outcome is 
−0.25 + 2𝑝 + 2.5𝑐. The width of interval I is 4𝑝 − 3𝑐 − (−0.5) = 0.5 + 4𝑝 − 3𝑐. Lemma 1 can be 
applied to intervals 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝐼𝑉 − 𝑉, with the following result: 
𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −[0.5 − 4𝑝 + 3𝑐](𝑐 − 𝑖)2 − [0.5 + 4𝑝 − 3𝑐](−0.25 − 2𝑝 + 2.5𝑐 − 𝑖)2
− 𝜎𝜔
2 [(4(𝑐 − 𝑝))
3
+ (4(𝑏 − 𝑐))
3
+ (4(0.125 + 𝑝 − 0.75𝑐))
3
] 
 
9.6. Codecision Scenario 4 
If 𝑐 >
6𝑝+2𝑏+0.5
7
, only a pooling equilibrium remains. Looking at the equilibrium under Scenario 
3, as the expected outcome over interval 𝐼 − 𝐼𝐼 goes above 𝑏, the equilibrium unravels. 
9.6.1. Utility in Scenario 4 
By applying Lemma 1, it is easy to see that 𝐸[𝑢𝐼
𝐶𝑜𝑑] = −𝑖2 − 𝜎𝜔
2 . 
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1  The member states in the Council can also unanimously amend Commission proposals under both 
consultation and codecision. For simplicity we ignore this in our model. This does not affect our conclusions. 
2 It could be argued that due to the Amsterdam reform of codecision the Commission no longer has formal 
powers under this procedure, because the Commission and its proposal no longer play a role when representatives 
of the Council and EP meet to work out a compromise in the Conciliation Committee. See, for example, Garrett 
and Tsebelis (2000). In light of this it is important to stress the Commission’s informational role, as we aim to do 
in this article. 
3 The work on delegation in the EU developed out of principal-agent analyses of United States politics. 
See, for example, Epstein and O’Halloran (1994). 
4 As argued by Crombez and Hix (2015): ”Multidimensional models of policy-making would lead to similar 
conclusions. Commission proposals would need to satisfy the same conditions to be adopted. The analysis would 
be more intricate, however, because the pivotal member states, MEPs and Commissioners would be different 
depending on the direction of policy change considered. […] For the purposes of our analysis no additional insights 
would be gained, however.” 
5 This contrasts with what Krehbiel (1992) calls “political information”, which is information on the 
preferences of other politicians. While in reality information may be incomplete regarding both policies and 
politics, we will assume complete political information, and only model information asymmetries regarding policy 
outcomes. We believe political information is usually relatively complete given the public character of party 
affiliations, voting records and public statements made by politicians. 
6 Council spending includes both the Council of the EU and the European Council, which is the meeting of 
the heads of state. Figures for 2014 final adopted budget. 
7 On some issues unanimity is required in the Council for approval of a proposal. In such instances our 
model still holds, with the most extreme member states being pivotal in the Council. 
8  Richer models could include more parameters, such as the Commission President’s nationality or 
perceived competency, or the allocation of portfolios to the various member states. In our model the allocation of 
portfolios does not matter because the Commission takes decisions as a college (i.e. Commissioners are not 
dictators in their policy domains). 
9 For this equilibrium to hold, it is required that 4𝑏 − 3𝑐 < ℓ0 +max(𝜔) = 1/2, i.e., the random variable 
can take on values that are extreme enough to swamp the ideological differences between 𝐵 and 𝐶. Otherwise a 
different equilibrium holds with less information transmission. 
10 For this equilibrium to hold, it is required that 4𝑏 − 3𝑐 <
1
2
 and 4𝑎 − 3𝑐 > ℓ0 +min(𝜔) = −1/2, i.e., 
the random variable can take on values that are extreme enough to swamp the ideological differences between 𝐵 
and 𝐶 and between 𝐴 and 𝐶. Otherwise a different equilibrium holds with less information transmission. 
11 For this equilibrium to hold, it is required that 4𝑏 − 3𝑐 < 1/2 and 4𝑝 − 3𝑐 > ℓ0 +min(𝜔) = −1/2, 
i.e., the random variable can take on values that are extreme enough to swamp the ideological differences between 
𝐵 and 𝐶 and between 𝑃 and 𝐶. Otherwise a different equilibrium holds with less information transmission. 
12 While the Council as a whole seems to have accepted the Spitzenkandidaten system, the UK opposed it. 
Considering that either the EPP or the Party of the European Socialists (PES) would win the election (Economist 
2014), this seems logical. For the UK, a left-wing PES President was likely too extreme. In addition, the UK’s 
opposition was also related to the second dimension of EU politics, i.e. pro- vs. anti-integration (Hix et al., 2014). 
For reasons of domestic politics, this dimension was especially salient to the UK (Economist, 2014). This explains 
why Juncker was not an acceptable candidate to the UK. All in all, it seems clear that the UK’s opposition to the 
Spitzenkandidaten system does not disprove our theory, given that the Council as a whole seems to have accepted 
it. 
13 Döring and Manow have aggregated data from multiple expert surveys into a position on a 0-10 left-right 
scale. The data used come from Castles and Mair (1983), Huber and Inglehart (1995), Benoit and Laver (2006) 
and Hooghe et al. (2010). 
14 Note that, as argued by Crombez and Hix (2015, p. 13): “We do not believe that each commissioner has 
exactly the same positions as his or her party. Nevertheless, because almost all commissioners are career party 
politicians, it is not unreasonable to assume that the left-right location of a commissioner’s national party is 
correlated with his or her position”. 
15 Single European Act. 
16 Under consultation: 𝑆(𝑎, 𝑏). Under codecision: 𝑆(𝑎, 𝑝, 𝑏). 
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